Deficits, debt and looming disaster : reform of entitlement programs may be the only hope by Michael Pakko
F
or the fiscal year 2008, the federal gov-
ernment’s deficit totaled $455 billion, 
the largest ever for a single year.  In the final 
days of the fiscal year, which ended Sept. 30, 
the total federal debt rose above $10 trillion 
for the first time.  Forecasts for 2009 antici-
pate an even larger deficit.
1  As a new presi-
dent and Congress take office, government 
deficits and the public debt will undoubt-
edly be a factor in economic policy discus-
sions, especially in light of ongoing financial 
uncertainty and economic weakness.
From an economic perspective, the size of 
the deficit and debt per se are not necessar-
ily as important as the underlying policies 
of spending and taxation.  By their very 
nature, deficits reflect an imbalance between 
expenditures and receipts.  Such imbalances 
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desirable under some circumstances.  And 
while rising government debt is often associ-
ated with direct economic costs, including 
higher interest rates and lower rates of pri-
vate investment, evidence on the significance 
of these effects is mixed.
Nevertheless, when deficits are part of a 
fundamental structural imbalance in the 
long term, they signal a need for serious 
attention and reform.  In a long-run fiscal 
analysis of U.S. federal government pro-
grams, this is demonstrably the case.
Government Accounting
The top panel of Figure 1 shows two 
measures of the federal deficit.  The blue 
line is the official measure reported by the 
government—$455 billion for fiscal 2008.  
The red line tracks the change in the total 
outstanding national debt from year to year.  
By this measure, the deficit exceeded $1 tril-
lion in 2008.
2  Note that the reported unified 
budget showed a surplus in 1998 through 
2001; however, the change in the national 
debt has recorded red ink in every fiscal year 
since 1969.  The difference between these 
two measures primarily reflects the treat-
ment of the Social Security trust funds.
3
By conventional accounting standards, 
the deficit is equal to the difference between 
total government spending and total revenues 
received, over a particular period of time.  The 
debt equals the sum of previously accumulated 
deficits (or surpluses), plus interest accrued.  
When it comes to government, however, the 
accounting is slightly more complicated.
The spending and taxing policies of the 
federal government are classified into “on-
budget” and “off-budget” categories.  Those 
activities that are considered off-budget 
include the Postal Service fund and, more 
important, Social Security.  The officially 
reported deficit is a “unified budget,” which 
includes the revenues and expenditures 
of these off-budget activities.  Because the 
Social Security trust funds are currently 
running large surpluses, their inclusion has 
the effect of lowering the reported deficit.  
For example, in 2008 the on-budget deficit 
was $638 billion, while the off-budget sur-
plus was $183 billion (due primarily to the 
Social Security trust fund).  As a result, the 
unified budget deficit was $455 billion.
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surement of the national debt:  Total public 
debt stood at $10 trillion at the end of fiscal 
2008, but debt “held by the public” was  
$5.8 trillion.  The difference is attribut-
able to $4.2 trillion held in government 
trust funds and other intragovernmental 
accounts, of which $2.4 trillion was held  
by the Social Security trust funds.
As long as the balances in the Social Secu-
rity trust funds are increasing, the on-budget 
deficit is partly offset by off-budget surpluses.   
When Social Security benefit payments begin 
exceeding revenues—which latest estimates 
suggest will begin in 2017—the off-budget 
components will add to the overall unified 
budget shortfall.  (It will be interesting to see if 
the federal government continues to report the 
unified budget figures when this is the case.)
When the trust funds begin to be drawn 
down, the government will be faced with the 
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need to borrow from the public in order 
to pay the obligations of the debt currently 
held in the trust funds.  This will result in 
an increase in the debt held by the public, 
with no change in the total outstanding 
debt.  In this sense, the total debt might 
better represent the long-term obligations 
of current government programs.  In fact, 
as will be discussed later, a proper account-
ing of the long-term obligations of federal 
entitlement programs is far greater than 
the value of government IOUs in the Social 
Security trust funds.
Relative Size Matters
Although both the deficit and debt 
for fiscal 2008 were the largest on record 
in dollar terms, putting these figures in 
proper perspective is important:  A more 
appropriate evaluation compares the 
deficit and the debt with national income.  
In the same sense that the manageability 
of a household’s debt depends on income 
(the ability of the household to make pay-
ments), evaluating the size of the govern-
ment’s debt should be gauged against the 
size of the national economy. 
When expressed as a percent of GDP, as 
shown in the lower panel of Figure 1, recent 
deficits have not been exceptionally large.  
In fact, official deficits in the mid-1980s 
were nearly twice as large as the 3.2 percent 
of GDP recorded for 2008.  Even using the 
alternative measure, last year’s change in  
the national debt amounted to 7.6 percent  
of GDP—only slightly greater than the  
7.3 percent of GDP registered in 1986.
4
Similarly, the $10 trillion national debt 
represents 69.5 percent of GDP—only 
slightly higher than the previous peak of  
67.3 percent of GDP that was reached in 
1996.  Netting out intragovernmental 
holdings, debt held by the public in 2008 
represented 40.3 percent of GDP, well 
below a previous peak of 49.4 percent 
in 1993.
5
U.S. government debt is also not par-
ticularly large compared with that of  
other countries.  In 2007, France’s govern-
ment debt amounted to approximately  
70 percent of GDP, Italy’s debt-to-GDP 
ratio was nearly 120 percent and Japan’s 
was over 170 percent.
Put in perspective, current defi-
cits and debt levels are high, but not 
The unified budget deficit/surplus figures represent the consolidated on-budget and off-budget balances as 
officially reported.  the change in federal debt is the change in gross federal debt from one year to the next 
(with sign reversed).
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cause for concern?
Economic Impact of Deficits 
In principle, deficits can serve a useful role 
by providing the ability to smooth the path 
of distortionary taxes over time, particularly 
over the business cycle.  Longer-term deficits 
can be justifiable if they finance long-term 
expenditures (as with an individual who 
finances the purchase of a home) or if they 
are expected to pay off in higher national 
income in the future (as an investment).  In 
a growing economy, even a permanently 
increasing deficit (if it is not increasing too 
fast) is sustainable in the long run.
It is often argued that government 
deficits, particularly longer-term deficits, 
impose a direct economic cost.  A con-
ventional Keynesian analysis of this effect 
begins from the fundamental national 
income accounting relationship that total 
domestic investment is equal to national 
savings, which includes the total of saving 
(or dissaving) by consumers, business and 
government.  When the government runs 
a deficit, the borrowing needed to finance 
the shortfall diverts the private savings 
as of sePteMber 2008
$ billions Percent of Debt 
held by the Public
China 587.0 10.1
Japan 573.2 9.8
United Kingdom 338.3 5.8
Caribbean banking Centers 1  185.3 3.2
oil exporters 2 182.1 3.1
brazil 141.9 2.4
all other  852.9 14.6
Total 2,860.7 49.0
soUrCe: U.s. treasury (treasury bulletin, table ofs-1) 
1  Caribbean banking centers include bahamas, bermuda, Cayman islands,  
   Netherlands antilles, Panama and british Virgin islands.  
2  oil exporters include ecuador, Venezuela, indonesia, bahrain, iran, iraq,  
   Kuwait, oman, Qatar, saudi arabia, the United arab emirates, algeria,  
   Gabon, Libya and Nigeria. 
MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS 
OF TREASURY SECURITIES
over the past decade, the borrowing needs of the U.s. Treasury have been met 
increasingly by purchases of debt from abroad.  at the end of fiscal year 1998, foreign 
holdings of Treasury securities totaled about $1.2 trillion, amounting to approximately 
37 percent of all debt held by the public.  By 2008, the dollar value of foreign-owned 
debt had risen to nearly $2.9 trillion, comprising almost 50 percent of outstanding 
publicly held debt.
Not surprisingly, the largest foreign holders of U.s. debt are countries that run 
persistent trade surpluses with the U.s.  Japan had long been the largest holder  
of Treasury debt, with its holdings rising from $276 billion in 1998 to $573 billion  
by the end of fiscal year 2008.  Reflecting the increasing presence of china  
in the global economy (and its large current account surplus), chinese investors 
have been closing in on the Japanese as the largest financiers of the U.s. debt and 
have recently overtaken Japan as the largest foreign holders of Treasury securities.  
chinese holdings of Treasury debt, which were $46 billion in 1998, skyrocketed to 
$587 billion by the end of fiscal year 2008.
The increasing share of debt ownership by foreigners has raised concerns about 
the prospect that foreign governments might use financial leverage as a creditor 
against the U.s. and its foreign policy.  for example, it has been suggested that if 
china were to dump its holdings of Treasury debt, the resulting market disruption 
would likely lead to higher U.s. interest rates and a collapse of the dollar on foreign 
exchange markets.
However, a recent analysis by the congressional Research service suggests  
that such a sudden and disruptive strategy is unlikely to be successful.9  Even the 
largest foreign holdings of U.s. government debt are smaller than the daily volume  
of trade in Treasury securities.  if such a strategy did disrupt the markets, the result-
ing decline in the value of U.s. Treasury securities would generate substantial losses 
to all debt holders, including those in the country attempting to use their debt hold-
ings as political leverage.  Moreover, trade linkages between the U.s. and creditor 
nations add to the self-destructive scenario of potential economic blackmail.
The more grave risk is that investors in U.s. Treasury debt, foreign or domestic, 
would lose faith in the ability of the U.s. government to meet its obligations in the 
face of unsustainable, long-run structural deficits.
Fear Not Foreign Ownership of U.S. Debt
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One of the expected manifestations of this 
“crowding out” effect is that government 
deficits, by increasing the competition for 
loanable funds, put upward pressure on 
interest rates.
This need not be the case, however.  A 
theoretical construct that often serves as a 
baseline for evaluating the effect of deficits 
is known as “Ricardian equivalence.”  In 
a closed economy with rational, forward-
looking consumers, Ricardian equivalence 
suggests that deficits may have no effect at 
all.  For instance, suppose the government 
were to implement a lump-sum tax cut, 
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These projections use Medicare and social security data from their respective trustees’ reports.  Medicaid is  
assumed to grow at the same rate as Medicare.  Discretionary spending from the war is phased out after 2010, 
with remaining discretionary spending assumed to expand at the same rate as GDP.  the data do not account for 
any spending expected to be associated with the emergency economic stabilization act of 2008.
financing the resulting budget shortfall 
by borrowing from the public, with the 
resulting debt to be repaid in the future 
with a tax increase.  Rational consumers 
would be expected to increase their sav-
ings in anticipation of higher future taxes, 
which would be needed to pay off the 
debt.  The increase in government dissav-
ing would be met by an increase in private 
sector saving, leaving overall national 
savings unchanged.  With no change in 
the balance between national savings and 
investment demand, there would be no 
upward pressure on interest rates.
The conditions under which Ricardian 
equivalence holds—even from a theoreti-
cal perspective—are quite restrictive; so, 
it is unlikely to be a literal description 
of the impact of deficit financing on the 
economy.  Nevertheless, it serves as a 
baseline for evaluating the relevance of 
crowding out effects that might be present 
if, for example, consumers are myopic 
about their own future tax burden or fail 
to consider the welfare of future genera-
tions, or if credit-market imperfections 
prevent them from responding optimally 
to government deficits.  
In this regard, the economic relevance 
of crowding out—and its consequent 
effect on interest rates—is an empirical 
matter.  As the deficit has increased in 
both size and public prominence over 
the past quarter-century, there has been 
a deluge of research on the subject.  One 
review of the literature in 2004 by Wil-
liam Gale and Peter Orszag reported on a 
total of 66 previous analyses of the topic.  
Of these, 33 found significant effects of 
budget deficits, while 33 found insignifi-
cant or mixed effects.  Gale and Orszag 
went on to conduct their own analysis, 
finding significant non-Ricardian effects:  
They suggest that a deficit increase 
amounting to 1 percent of GDP lowers 
national savings by 0.5 to 0.8 percent and 
that expected future deficits raise long-
term interest rates by 25 to 35 basis points.
These findings have been controversial, 
however.  In fact, another paper circulat-
ing at the same time by Eric Engen and 
Glenn Hubbard suggested that the debt, 
rather than the deficit, was the appropri-
ate measure to consider.  They found that 
a 1 percent increase in the debt-to-GDP 
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 1 In its “Mid-Session Review” in July 2008, the 
Office of Management and Budget projected 
a deficit of $482 billion for fiscal year 2009, 
which ends Sept. 30, 2009.  Implementation 
of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
is likely to add an additional several hundred 
billion dollars to the Treasury’s upcoming 
borrowing needs.
 2 The change in national debt for 2008 includes 
$300 billion in the new Supplementary 
Financing Program Account.  Through this 
program, the Treasury issues additional debt, 
depositing the proceeds into its account with 
the Federal Reserve.  Because the Treasury 
records this as an increase in cash on-hand, 
it should more accurately be subtracted from 
the total change in debt.  With this adjust-
ment, the change in the national debt for 2008 
would be just over $700 billion.
 3 There are two Social Security trust funds, 
Old Age and Survivor Insurance (OASI) and 
Disability Insurance (DI).  At the end of fiscal 
year 2008, they stood at $2.15 trillion and 
$216 billion, respectively.
 4 Adjusting for the $300 billion described in 
endnote 2, the increase in the national debt 
for 2008 was 5.4 percent of GDP. 
 5 After adjusting for the $300 billion held in  
the Supplementary Financing Program  
Account, the total federal debt represented 
68.2 percent of GDP, while debt held by the 
public amounted to 38.7 percent.
 6 See Social Security Administration.
 7 Treasury Department, 2007 Financial Report 
of the United States Government.
 8 See Kotlikoff (2006 and 2008).
 9 See Morrison and Labonte.
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ratio led to an increase in interest rates of 
only four to five basis points.
Recent experience has renewed skepticism 
about the effect of government deficits on 
interest rates.  As the U.S. government defi-
cit and debt have risen sharply over the past 
few years, long-term interest rates remained 
abnormally low relative to short-term rates.  
One factor that has evidently contributed to 
this phenomenon—not explicitly consid-
ered under the conventional Keynesian view 
or in the Ricardian-equivalence analysis— 
is the effect of savings coming into this 
country from abroad.  The increasing 
demand for borrowing by the U.S. Treasury 
in recent years has been met with a substan-
tial foreign inflow.  (See sidebar on Page 7.)  
Even if U.S. residents are non-Ricardian in 
their behavior, the demand for U.S. Trea-
sury securities by foreigners is likely to have 
mitigated upward pressure on interest rates 
that might otherwise have been observed.
A Demographic Time Bomb 
While the immediate impacts of govern-
ment deficits and debt are a matter of some 
controversy, most economists agree that 
the long-term fiscal outlook for the U.S. 
requires serious attention.  The retirement 
of the Baby Boom generation and a slow- 
ing rate of growth in the labor force will 
create a demographic time bomb in which 
entitlement growth threatens to swamp 
available resources.
As mentioned earlier, the Social Security 
trust funds are projected to begin running 
down in 2017.  By 2041, they are expected 
to be depleted.
6  One way of measuring 
the long-run shortfall is to estimate the 
present value of unfunded obligations, that 
is, to estimate how much money would be 
needed, in today’s dollars, to pay for future 
promises in excess of expected tax revenues.  
In the case of Social Security, the U.S. Trea-
sury estimates that paying promised benefits 
through the year 2081 would require $6.8 
trillion, in addition to taxes collected under 
current law.
7
The situation is even more dire when we 
consider health-care costs.  The unfunded 
obligations of Medicare parts A and B 
amount to a present value of $25.7 trillion.  
Medicare Part D (prescription drug cover-
age) adds another $8.4 trillion.  All told, the 
shortfall for government social insurance 
programs comes to a present value of $40.9 
trillion.  This is the government’s official 
estimate—some private sector economists 
suggest that the total burden is even greater.  
Economist Lawrence Kotlikoff has recently 
estimated the total unfunded liabilities of 
current federal programs at $70 trillion.
8 
Figure 2 displays recent forecasts from 
the Government Accountability Office, 
illustrating the budget implications of these 
trends.  The upper panel shows accelerat-
ing deficits over the next seven decades.  
Assuming revenues held constant at the 
historical average of 18 percent, these pro-
jections show the deficit rising to over  
40 percent of GDP by 2080.  The lower  
panel of Figure 2 shows the implications 
for the federal debt: an exponential rate of 
increase that reaches over 600 percent of 
GDP by 2080.  This would far exceed any 
level of government borrowing in history.
These projections are unlikely to actually 
occur.  The trends are unsustainable.  Long 
before reaching such unprecedented level 
of borrowing, there would surely be a crisis 
of confidence among U.S. creditors, both 
domestic and foreign.  
Current measures of the federal deficit 
and the national debt, as dismal as they 
might appear, fail to reflect full conse-
quences of current-law fiscal policy.  The 
unfunded future liabilities of government 
entitlement programs imply rising deficits 
and a ballooning public debt far larger than 
today’s shortfalls.  And debates about the 
immediate economic impact of govern-
ment deficits on private savings and interest 
rates, while of academic interest, fail to 
address the full importance of these long-
run consequences.  Fundamental reform of 
entitlement programs is critical for putting 
U.S. fiscal policy on a long-run sustainable 
path. 
Michael Pakko is an economist at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  For more on his work, 
see http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/pakko/
index.html.  Luke Shimek provided research 
assistance.
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